Preventing Radicalisation Towards Violent Extremism - A Matter of Society not Security

Authors:
Richard Bärnthaler and Stuart West
(Vienna University of Economics and Business)

Counsel:
Billy Batware
(Regional Academy on the United Nations)
Elena Rigacci Hay
(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime)

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1. Abstract

Much of the early research into the phenomenon of radicalisation explained it as a process broadly initiated by an individual, suffering from mental illness or a sense of marginalisation, acting in isolation. Contemporary discussion has since broadened the factors under consideration to include social, network, political, and media-related explanations, amongst others. However, the individual remains the unit of analysis; a deliberative actor consciously choosing to become radicalised. This paper seeks to build an alternative conceptualisation of the individual as an institutionally-embedded, fundamentally social actor, whose behaviour is to some extent shaped by the way in which that individual internalises the values and norms that constitute the various formal and informal institutions having reconstitutive downward causation upon them. The authors conduct a review of existing literature in order to combine the broad variety of factors associated with radicalisation with such an institutional theoretical framework. Empirical evidence is garnered through a systematic reading and discursive analysis of policy documentation produced in the UK and the Netherlands; the case studies considered in the paper. Findings are supported by the conduct of semi-structured interviews with experts from both law enforcement and academia. The paper concludes that governments must move away from the fragmented approach to policy-making prevalent today, instead understanding the prevention of radicalisation as a matter of society - not security - with emphasis to be placed on bringing all peoples closer together whilst retaining their individual socio-cultural identities; not simply bringing those considered ‘marginalised’ and thus ‘at risk’ closer and in-line with the majority. The paper contributes a holistic alternative policy framework to the debate, replacing traditional hard policy approaches and more recent efforts to attach a soft policy contingent to predominantly hard policy instruments.

2. Introduction

The world has reached a point of heightened instability. As nation states have prioritised economic growth agendas and subsequent increases in per capita income have enabled more and more people to consume conspicuously, societal fragmentation has occurred and an ever-greater impact has been had on our planet’s biophysical limits. Global temperatures have risen, water pollution has become widespread, air quality has worsened, and forests have continued to be torn down. Recent waves of globalisation and financialisation have had a somewhat homogenizing effect on societies and cultures, whilst causing changes to our climate and increasing competition for scarce natural resources. Such events have stoked unrest amongst peoples who perceive their way of life to be threatened by infringement upon their cultures.
and environments. As a result, violence has increased worldwide in recent years; 180,000 people died in 42 armed conflicts in 2014 compared with 56,000 in 2008\(^1\).

The number of deaths from terrorism has grown even more steeply, with a fivefold increase experienced worldwide between 2000 and 2013\(^2\). With regard to this latter form of violence, 2015 has been a particularly tumultuous year; mass killings occurred across the African continent including a mass shooting at Garissa University (Kenya) by Al-Shabaab and the massacre of villages in Borno State (Nigeria) by Boko Haram, numerous suicide bombings across the Middle East including the bombing of Sana'a mosque (Yemen) by ISIS and the bombing of the Kabul police academy (Afghanistan) by the Taliban, as well as an attack on Charlie Hebdo headquarters in Paris and the most recent events occurring across the city - to name just a few. Such attacks suggest that world events are highly interconnected; a realisation evident in the significant number of young foreign fighters who have travelled from the West to participate in acts of violent extremism abroad.

Within this terrorism context and particularly in response to the emerging prevalence of young foreign fighters, Western policy-makers are prioritising efforts to counter violent extremism (CVE); evident in the summits hosted by the United States (February 2015) and the European Union (June 2015) titled as such and the funds being made available for associated initiatives. It has been recognised that specific attention should be paid to the youth population, due to both their relative vulnerability to extremist views, as well as their unique ability to offer a vital alternative perspective on the issue. However, recent policy approaches have insufficiently capitalised on lessons learned from the initial counter-terrorism frameworks introduced in the aftermath of 9/11. It is in light of this that this paper has been written, with the aim to highlight key issues associated with existing efforts to prevent radicalisation (and subsequent violent extremism), whilst providing a holistic alternative policy framework.

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3. Theoretical Framework

To interpret social phenomena such as radicalisation, one must attempt to understand where the power lies that causes them to occur. Hay\(^3\) argues that any effort to construct a notion of causality appeals, “whether explicitly or (more likely) implicitly, to ideas about structure and agency”. Traditionally, social theorists portrayed agency and structure as a dualism consisting of two distinct poles. At one extreme, power was seen to reside with the individual actor alone whilst, at the other extreme, power was thought to permeate throughout the entire social structure. An alternative conceptualisation of the agent-structure dualism as a multi-layered, complex, and relational dynamic provides a more nuanced understanding of young people and the process of radicalisation. Lawson\(^4\) articulates the ‘social realm’ within which humans live as “that domain of all phenomena, existents, properties, etc. (if any), whose formation/coming into existence and/or continuing existence necessarily depend at least in part upon human beings and their interactions”. From this perspective, young people are considered to be intentional whilst the ‘social realm’ is seen to possess “emergent powers that enable and facilitate, but also restrict and direct, individual action”\(^5\). A holistic ontology is implied that depicts the individual as an institutionally-embedded and fundamentally social actor. In this context, institutions are seen to structure and coordinate human existence and, in doing so, “regularise life, support values and protect and produce interests”\(^6\). ‘Social’ seeks to capture that the individual, whilst an autonomous entity, is inseparable from the society within which they choose to live, and the informal institutions – namely cultural practices and social norms – they subsequently operate under.

Institutions are constitutive in nature and transform individuals’ behaviour. According to Chang and Evans\(^7\), all institutions could be said to be symbolic, instilling certain values, or worldviews into those who operate within them. As individuals continue to behave under a certain set of institutions, they begin to internalise the values embodied in them, resulting in a change in the character of those individuals.

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This is not to say that institutions are the sole determinant of an individual’s character and behaviour. A person cannot be reduced to the structure alone; individual choice and adaptation remains a crucial factor as "individuals follow norms to a different extent". Humans are moral beings with an understanding of right and wrong which, whilst partially dependent on their institutional setting, is still open to interpretation and acceptance or rejection by reflexive individuals. Rather, institutions form social structures that involve intra- and inter-institutional reconstitutive downward causation, which shapes individual habits of thought and action to a certain extent. This constitutive dimension of institutions suggests that institutional change comes about not through ‘material projects’ alone – governments pushing their interests, for example – but also through ‘cultural projects’; the adaptation of worldviews held by individuals involved. This is not to say that such a process is not immune from human agency and acts of manipulation, but rather that institutional change is somewhat more complex than the tweaking of the more formal elements of the overarching social structure alone.

4. Terminological Clarification

The analysis of some Western states’ definitions of the concept of ‘radicalisation’ brings to light a predominant focus on terms and concepts such as ‘process’, ‘undemocratic’, ‘violence’, ‘political/ideological objective’, ‘far reaching societal changes’, and ‘individual/person’. These official definitions are characterised by a number of implicit assumptions. This paper argues that some of them are useful, whilst others are rather limiting. However, certain commonly cited characteristics of radicalisation can be largely agreed upon; namely that it involves the pursuit of an ideological or political objective that might aim at radically changing society, as well as the conceptualisation of radicalisation as a ‘process’. Moreover, it is important to note that radicalisation could - but does not have to - result in the use of violent means, such as acts of terrorism. The sole emphasis on individuals prevalent in

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10 Hodgson, ‘What Are Institutions?’ (2006) 40 Association for Evolutionary Economics
definitions reviewed, however, is challenged by the authors on the basis that such a view undermines the complexity of the radicalisation process. This individual-focused conceptualisation assumes that individuals are autonomous actors operating in a social vacuum of sorts. Consequently, institutions such as laws, language, conventions, and norms are seen to have no role in forming individuals and influencing their behaviour. Instead, classical institutional theorists argue that institutions do indeed shape and adjust beliefs, understanding, preferences, and, ultimately, actions. Consequently, 'radicalisation' is more than an individual's autonomous decisions, but rather a structural process. It is important to highlight that such a 'process' is not characterised by linearity; the 'process' of radicalisation is rather relational, non-linear, and context-specific. Additionally, the discussed definitions come from government sources of democratic states and are therefore inescapably political; an explanation for the constant focus on democracy in almost all of the definitions. This implies an ideological perspective, which does not question Western values but rather assumes them to be the model to be spread all over the world - regardless of the local appropriateness of such values. The conceptualisation of radicalisation used in this paper thus looks to mitigate this bias.

In sum the authors understand 'radicalisation' as a structural process (relational, non-linear, and context-specific) that involves an attempt to reach an ideological or political objective (which might aim at radical societal change), undermines prevalent values (not necessarily only democratic ones), and has the potential (but not the necessity) to comprise violent means including terrorism. Whilst ‘radicalisation’ (as touched upon in the definition above) refers simply to the attainment of views considered in opposition to those harboured by mainstream society and the potential desire to pursue political or ideological objectives associated with such views, the particular form of radicalisation studied in this report is that which could later manifest itself in extremism and violence. For convenience, 'radicalisation' shall be used by the authors to refer to this specific form for the remainder of this paper. Radicalisation serves as the focus of the paper due to its fundamental role as the process that results in an undesirable outcome - violent extremism. Efforts targeting the outcome rather than the causal process are deemed equivalent to responding to symptoms rather than preventing their root causes. Due to this relationship between radicalisation and violent extremism, the prevention of radicalisation often tends to fall within nation states’ counter-terrorism strategies (see UK case study below). Therefore, it is crucial to investigate such

strategies in order to analyse approaches to prevent radicalisation sufficiently. Other authors\textsuperscript{14} have used the term anti-radicalisation in this context. Anti-radicalisation - the focus of this paper - differs from de- and counter-radicalisation in that, whilst the latter two concepts are perceived to be focusing on rehabilitation and mitigation respectively, anti-radicalisation aims at prevention. Having said this, it becomes obvious that a distinct demarcation is not always possible. Thus, the involvement of de- and counter-radicalisation concepts in this paper does not reflect inconsistency in the use of these terms, but rather an attempt to acknowledge the topic’s complexity and holistic nature; the focus, however, is clearly on anti-radicalisation.

5. Methodological Approach

The research questions addressed by this paper are i) How do contemporary counter-terrorism policies affect the process of radicalisation towards violent extremism? ii) What could an alternative approach look like? In an attempt to answer these questions, the authors seek to present the reader with both theoretical and practical knowledge. The former is based upon an extensive review of existing literature, which aims to create a strong and coherent theoretical framework for the subsequent practical analysis, whilst introducing the fields of (anti-) radicalisation and violent extremism. The approach to practical knowledge production is qualitative, with evidence based on a combination of primary (expert interviews) and secondary sources (government documents and academic literature). The output of the approach is a series of case studies; a method selected for its respect for context-dependency and systematic contribution to the effectiveness of a scientific discipline\textsuperscript{15}. So as to remain consistent with the ontological presuppositions embodied in the authors’ theoretical framework, these case studies are constructed using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). The authors interpret discourse as social processes that produce and transform signification and meaning and thus consider it as a network of institutions with the power to shape understandings and produce social capacities\textsuperscript{16}. As the primary research question essentially seeks an explanation of how policies affect the behaviour of actors, government policies relating to radicalisation and terrorism are treated as artefacts contributing to a discursive paradigm which defines “the (im)possible, the (im)probable, the natural, the normal [and] what counts as a problem”\textsuperscript{17}. Other

\textsuperscript{15} Flyvbjerg B, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’ (2006) 12 Qualitative Inquiry 219
\textsuperscript{17} Hayward C, ‘De-Facing Power’ (Cambridge University Press 2000) 35
artefacts include political strategies, talks and language more broadly, which have also been analysed as part of the authors’ qualitative research. The authors perform a systematic reading and rhetorical analysis of discourse artefacts so as to highlight any mobilisation of bias. Discourse produces subjects, fixes meaning and defines action, and the authors thus analyse policy documents and political speeches to highlight social asymmetries brought about by the unit of analysis favoured, the definitions of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘violent extremism’ operationalised and the actors empowered – but also those disempowered – by the framing of the problem as well as the proposed solutions. In order to identify the implications of rhetoric, case studies include an evaluation of societies within the UK and the Netherlands impacted by discourse artefacts analysed. The state of UK society as a whole after the introduction and subsequent revision of the Government’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) is juxtaposed with the state of society in Amsterdam in the aftermath of ‘Wij Amsterdammers’, as well as the atmosphere brought about by an alternative discourse constructed by a non-governmental organisation in the UK county of Essex, in an attempt to identify the exacerbation of problems associated with blame, responsibility and a lack of societal cohesion. Fieldwork was carried out in the form of semi-structured expert interviews with a senior law enforcement official and an academic specialising in the topic of radicalisation so as to corroborate the information gathered through the critical discursive analysis and provide further insights into the phenomena being studied.

6. Analysis and Argumentation

The design of contemporary policies relating to radicalisation clearly aligns with a concept that predominantly focuses upon the individual perpetrator as the unit of analysis. For example, UK Home Secretary Theresa May explained that Britain’s new counter-extremism strategy would include “measures such as introducing banning orders for groups and disruption orders for individuals, for those who are out there actively trying to promote this hatred and intolerance which can lead to division in our society and undermines our British values”. Such an individual-focused approach implies an atomistic, mechanistic, and objectivist ontology and a somewhat linear understanding of the process of radicalisation. Radicalised youths are perceived to be deliberative, frustrated individuals (relative deprivation theory).

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20 Norgaard RB, Development Betrayed: The End of Progress and a Co-Evolutionary Revisioning of the Future (Routledge 1994)
making volitional behavioural decisions based upon exposure to a charismatic leader or an extremist forum (exposure theory) – their journey towards becoming radicalised traceable along a standardised, linear trajectory\(^\text{21}\). Such an explanation of the process of radicalisation is overly simplistic and this conceptualisation of the agent-structure dynamic has been criticised as naïve voluntarism; placing too great an onus on the individual as an intentional actor culpable for their actions\(^\text{22}\).

The idea that individuals in isolation become exposed to extremist literature 'online' and become radicalised as a result is not only a ‘red herring’ - a possible process that has proved to be extremely rare\(^\text{23}\) - but also represents an out-dated perspective on the internet. Today, the internet is a social institution that is very much part of young people's material reality; the division between physical life and time spent online is no longer relevant. Whilst willingness on the part of the intentional individual is certainly a necessary condition for participation in violence, it is insufficient alone as an explanation for an individual becoming radicalised\(^\text{24}\). Instead, recruitment and radicalisation are social processes through which individuals become part of a collective institution and internalise their views and practices\(^\text{25}\). Ideological artefacts such as videos or rhetoric on social media play a role, but individuals’ passage to violence is relational, resulting from the web of interactions that that individual has with a plethora of actors; extremist and non-extremist, as well as face-to-face and online\(^\text{26}\). Such a web of interactions includes those between individuals that become radicalised and those who represent that which such individuals become radically opposed to.

When one considers the instances of individuals becoming radicalised in Western countries, there is one common theme - the society in which these people live. In many cases, the people in question suggested that they felt marginalised by the ‘host’ society, and subsequently pushed to look for other social

\(^{21}\) Bigo D, Bonelli L, Guittet EP and Ragazzi F, ‘Preventing and Countering Youth Radicalisation in the EU: Study for the LIBE Committee’ (2014)


\(^{23}\) International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, ‘Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe’ (ICSR 2007)


\(^{26}\) Bigo D, Bonelli L, Guittet EP and Ragazzi F, ‘Preventing and Countering Youth Radicalisation in the EU: Study for the LIBE Committee’ (2014)
networks. Once individuals become a part of extremist networks they are pressured towards participation due to an increased ‘identity cost’ associated with non-participation. Participation is thus an intentional choice made by the individual, but one shaped by the informal institutional setting within which that individual is embedded.

Contemporary policy regarding radicalisation is thus arguably misdirected. In a study commissioned by the European Parliament’s Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Bigo et al. identified three key policy categories: 1) pre-emptive judicial powers such as extended pre-charge detention periods, 2) administrative measures such as stop and search activities by law enforcement agencies, and 3) soft policies such as community cohesion programs. Traditionally, nation states focused upon categories one and two - as is highlighted within the UK case study below – with category 3 policies appearing in national strategies to differing extents in later revisions. A level of discrimination against certain groups within society is inevitable with such policies, resulting in the generation of resentment within these groups towards the authorities and their host society in general, as well as a sense of alienation. Such discrimination has come, namely, in the form of ethnic profiling. For example, the number of ‘stop and search’ interactions between law enforcement officers and black and Asian males increased significantly in the US and the UK in the aftermath of 9/11 and the 7/7 bombings. A positive feedback loop thus occurs, whereby the very behaviour a policy agenda seeks to stamp out is in fact further encouraged by such policies due to their prejudicial side effects.

7. UK CONTEST – A Case Study

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27 Bizina M, Northfield VT and Gray DH, ‘Radicalization of Youth as a Growing Concern for Counter-Terrorism Policy’ (2014) 5 Global Security Studies
30 Bigo D, Bonelli L, Guittet EP and Ragazzi F, ‘Preventing and Countering Youth Radicalisation in the EU: Study for the LIBE Committee’ (2014)
CONTEST refers to the UK Government’s counter-terrorism strategy established by the Home Office in the aftermath of 9/11. The strategy has evolved over time; first developed in 2003, the Home Office made documentation public in 2006 and provided revised versions in 2009 and 2011. A significant adaptation came in the revised version of 2009, which outlined the expansion of CONTEST’s scope beyond seeking to reduce the risks posed by international terrorism, so as to encompass all forms of terrorism – a reaction to the growth in ‘home grown’ terrorism and foreign-born fighters experienced worldwide. CONTEST as a strategy is broken down into four strands - ‘Pursue’, ‘Prevent’, ‘Protect’, and ‘Prepare’, with Prevent largely responsible for mitigating the risk of radicalisation – and officially aims to “reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence”.

In its early years, CONTEST sought to maintain and enhance the capabilities of counter-terrorism policing (including increased firearms capabilities) and expand intelligence activity as well as the capture and analysis of communications data within the appropriate legal framework, as laid out in the government’s National Security Strategy. Upon review, notably the “Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers” conducted by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department in January 2011, CONTEST and related strategies were deemed to have the wrong balance between national security and civil liberties, with some powers found to be neither necessary nor proportionate.

However, change consisted of small-scale adaptation rather than a major shift in the government’s theoretical framework. Formal institutions that were either amended or introduced following the reviews referred to above retained the explicit focus on the individual as the (arguably sole) unit of analysis. The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIM) Act 2011 that abolished control orders in favour of TPIMs referred to the ‘individual’ 272 times, whilst the words ‘community’, ‘society’,

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34 ibid. 17
36 ibid.
‘cohesion’ and ‘integration’ did not feature once, for example\textsuperscript{37}. Instead, soft policies that sought to advance integration and encourage unity in diversity were marked as out of scope of the Government’s counter-terrorism strategy - “the Government will not securitise its integration work: that would be neither effective, proportionate nor necessary”\textsuperscript{38}. Interestingly, such an explicit position on the part of the UK Government is contradicted by a number of events, explored in more detail below. Whilst the authors consider the securitisation of welfare to be deeply undesirable, the categorisation of government policies as either related to security or integration implies a fragmented approach, based upon an atomistic and mechanistic understanding of social phenomena; preventing radicalisation and encouraging integration are conceptualised as distinct problems to be dealt with separately, rather than inter-relating components of a holistic reality, themselves perpetually changing whilst continuously redefining one another.

The current state of counter-terrorism policy – and strategies to prevent the radicalisation of vulnerable people in particular – is therefore a result of a complex development trajectory. In the revised CONTEST document published in July 2011, the Home Office stated: “In all our Prevent work we must be clear about our purpose and our methods. The great majority of people in this country find terrorism repugnant and will never support it. Work to challenge ideology should not try to change majority opinion because it does not need changing. Our purpose is to reach the much smaller number of people who are vulnerable to radicalisation”\textsuperscript{39}. Whilst perhaps referring specifically to people’s views of terrorism, the inclusion of a statement condoning majority opinion and emphasising a focus on the exceptional individuals’ behaviour, whilst consistent with the Government’s conceptualisation of radicalisation as a personal process rather than a social one, is problematic. Such rhetoric implies that the attitudes and behaviours of the general public towards minority groups, as well as their understanding of phenomena such as radicalisation and violent extremism, are appropriate and not in need of change through government intervention or otherwise. Instead, it is the small number of radical extremists that must be changed. Such a perspective is particularly evident in recent comments from Prime Minister David Cameron, most

\textsuperscript{37} ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} ibid. 12
notably in a newspaper article he wrote in 2014 in which he posited "we need to be far more muscular in promoting British values and the institutions that uphold them"\textsuperscript{40}. 

Government counter-terrorism and community integration policy thus arguably reproduces the ‘us and them’ mentality, placing emphasis on individuals not currently integrated within their ‘host society’ (British born minorities as well as immigrants) to adopt traditional British values, rather than garnering greater understanding among the ‘host society’ of the customs and cultures held by the ‘parallel society’ so as to enable people to show greater acceptance and respect for one another’s social norms and celebrate unity in diversity rather than homogeneity. Such conditionality therefore risks reinforcing the very segregation such policies are intended to overcome, and arguably even serves as a factor in the complex, relational journey towards radicalisation experienced by individuals feeling isolated by the government and society they are meant to be served by and a part of.

UK counter-terrorism activities have also been criticised for their continually disproportionate infringement on the civil liberties of British Muslims. Former Metropolitan Police Chief Superintendent Dal Babu recently spoke out against Prevent, suggesting that the initiative was a mechanism for the mass surveillance of Muslims\textsuperscript{41}. Focus groups with British Muslims have highlighted their bereavement resulting from a perceived subjection to religious profiling, particularly through the exercise of Schedule 7 of the 2000 Terrorism Act at borders and ports where many feel they are disproportionately stopped, questioned, and detained\textsuperscript{42}. Advocacy organisation CAGE\textsuperscript{43} has proclaimed that Prevent focuses specifically on theology and ideology as causes of politically-motivated violence (PMV) which has, they argue, made Muslim beliefs “the subject of suspicion, surveillance, misrepresentation and prosecution”\textsuperscript{44}.


\textsuperscript{44} Mohammed J and Siddiqui A, ‘The Prevent Strategy: A Cradle to Grave Police-State’ (CAGE 2013) 8
Questions have also been raised about the increasing size of UK counter-terrorism operations. The legitimacy of such questions is, to some extent, corroborated by the extent to which various powers have been exercised over time in the UK. The ‘Channel’ program – an initiative introduced under Prevent in 2007 to identify early on those considered ‘vulnerable’ or, ‘at risk’ of being drawn towards extremism or violence and intervene in an attempt to de-radicalise them – saw just 5 referrals in its first year, 179 in 2008/2009, 467 in 2009/2010, and 748 in 2012/2013. In July 2015, the front page of London’s Evening Standard read “London child, 3, in terror alert over radicalisation”, referring to the fact that a three-year-old child was one of 1069 Londoners who had been referred to the ‘Channel’ program since the start of 2012. Today a truly multi-agency response to the risk of radicalisation, Prevent is seen by some as the securitisation of professionals working in the health and education spheres, calling upon figures from almost every aspect of a young person’s life to be analysing their character and behaviour in an attempt to identify potential vulnerability or risk posed to others.

Connected to this question of size is a question of scope, and the inconsistent manner in which the UK Government has coordinated with the wider public sector, as well as civil society; particularly in light of statements regarding the Government’s refrain from securitising such agents, followed by actions to the contrary. Support of civil society organisations has been varied and issues have arisen regarding which organisations the government has chosen to work with and which it has excluded. Such selectivity can be seen as “infringing upon the principles of freedom of expression and religious practise and curtailing the democratic debate”. Furthermore, problems arose as a result of budgetary allocations. Due to the fact that the UK Government assumed dire economic and social conditions were a major driver behind violent extremism, Prevent funding was provided to local authorities based upon, amongst other factors, the size of their Muslim population. When significant cuts to government spending on communities were made during the 2008-2012 global financial crisis, many NGOs were forced to adjust their project work so as to qualify for the copious Prevent funds, resulting in a situation where Muslims received greater attention from civil society initiatives, regardless of the vulnerability such individuals faced, or risk they posed.

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48 Comments made during expert interview conducted with Francesco Ragazzi on October 6th 2015
49 Bigo D, Bonelli L, Guittet EP and Ragazzi F, ‘Preventing and Countering Youth Radicalisation in the EU: Study for the LIBE Committee’ (2014)
Such circumstances were counter-productive, leading to increased stigmatisation of Muslims with an inevitably undesirable backlash in the form of heightened frustration and, arguably, risk of radicalisation\textsuperscript{50}.

\section*{8. Soft Policies}

Approaches that gear towards preventing radicalisation "can differ from each other not only in the aims, objectives and the methods they employ but also in the wider societal context under which they operate. This context includes the local conditions prevailing in the country, city or even community where they are located, the type of behaviour being targeted, and the degree of control that those responsible for delivering the program are able to exert"\textsuperscript{51}. Different socio-economic conditions and institutions exist within different regions of a country. Therefore, the closer a policy is tailored to local circumstances, the more effective it is likely to be. As former Metropolitan Police Commander Ian Carter emphasised, a nation state “shouldn’t adopt a one-size-fits-all approach. Locally, there will be ways of influencing and engaging people. You can have a generic model, but it has to have bespoke, local ways to make it work”\textsuperscript{52}. Consequently, this chapter focuses on local approaches and strategies, namely in Amsterdam (Netherlands) and Essex (UK). Whilst positive examples are drawn from these two case studies, they constitute part of two policy frameworks that contain problematic elements. The paper therefore seeks to draw inspiration from these locations whilst not condoning these approaches in their entirety.

\subsection*{8.1. Amsterdam}

After the killing of Dutch film director Theo van Gogh on November 2nd 2004, the Netherlands drastically changed its policies with regards to terrorism and radicalisation so as to acknowledge injustice and discrimination as key drivers. The national government provided a flexible framework - general guidelines, training, and funding - from which local authorities had the freedom to decide on the measures they apply autonomously. Consequently, the large cities in the Netherlands developed their own programs, very much shaped around Amsterdam's strategy. In Amsterdam, the "city's leaders recognised a policy gap between general preventive work - official acts and institutions that promote mediation of disputes and social cohesion - and the counterterrorism measures implemented by police, military, and

\textsuperscript{50} ibid.
\textsuperscript{51} Clutterbuck L, ‘Deradicalization Programs and Counterterrorism: A Perspective on the Challenges and Benefits’ (Middle East Institute 2015) 10
\textsuperscript{52} Comments made during expert interview conducted with Ian Carter on August 6th 2015
intelligence officials.\(^{53}\) In order to close this gap the city introduced the action plan 'Wij Amsterdammers 2005-2010' (‘We Amsterdammers’). This action plan was integrated into the ‘Platform Amsterdam Samen’ (‘Platform Amsterdam Together’) unit; established outside of the usual bureaucratic structures and therefore able to address problems in a more flexible way whilst being more sensitive to bottom up initiatives led by citizens.\(^{54}\)

The practical implementation of ‘We Amsterdammers’ was based upon a close and interconnected cooperation between ministries and other governmental agencies, educational facilities, think-tanks, (freelance) consultants, and religious institutions as well as a constant information-sharing process between them.\(^{55}\) The aim was to create and strengthen a joint Amsterdam identity with its core values of freedom and tolerance. In doing so it focused its attempts on three pillars: general prevention, specific prevention, and direct intervention. General prevention adopted the most long-term stance and looked to address both real and perceived grievances. Specific prevention aimed at mitigating and countering polarising effects between different groups in the city; here the City of Amsterdam focused mainly on the avoidance of polarisation between Muslim and Non-Muslim groups. Moreover, the city placed special emphasis on vulnerable groups such as youth. Many of these measures were inspired by the Hungarian-American professor Ervin Staub, whose theoretical concepts focused on media projects that help to understand different cultures, deep contact and dialogue between various groups (e.g. through school, sport, business, or neighbourhood), the promotion of a shared vision, inclusive environments for children, involvement of minority groups into politics, positive leadership, and supporting influential individuals to take responsibility.\(^{56}\) In line with Staub's recommendations the preventive measures included organised meetings, trainings, and co-financed TV productions to understand different cultures (e.g. ‘West side soap’), as well as conferences, neighbourhood festivals (e.g. Ramadan festival for all citizens of Amsterdam), art projects that focused on the concept of individual empowerment, leadership programs, and social cohesion. Moreover, the city implemented various programs to help minority youths to establish themselves in the job market, train public and social workers to detect, prevent and fight


\(^{54}\) European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, ‘Inter-Cultural and Inter-Religious Policies in Amsterdam, the Netherlands’ (2009)


radicalisation tendencies, and improve the living conditions in disadvantaged neighbourhoods\textsuperscript{57}. Wij Amsterdammers’ third pillar retained the direct intervention measures necessary for the management and mitigation of the most imminent threats posed and thus inevitably involved a focus on the individual. A central role was played by the Information Centre on Radicalisation (Informatiehuishouding Radicalisering), which received information and built a ‘rich picture’ that captured the broad range of actors and networks operating throughout the city, whilst also providing an advisory service to relevant government agencies regarding cases of violent urban unrest. Summing up, the action plan 'Wij Amsterdammers' consisted of three important dimensions: First, the stimulation of social cohesion (i.e. binding and bridging social capital); second, the stimulation of societal resilience to prevent processes of radicalisation (e.g. reducing real and perceived discrimination, creating a tolerant approach to religious persuasion, reducing disruptive and provocative behaviour, and promoting mutual respect); and third, the countering of radicalisation (e.g. empowerment, active involvement of professionals, Information Centre on Radicalisation)\textsuperscript{58}.

Amsterdam's policy conceptualises people as more than isolated individuals. It focuses heavily on group dynamics and considers individuals as fundamentally social actors whose behaviour cannot be understood without analysing their surrounding context - the society and its various institutions. The distinction between prevention and intervention illustrates the difference between soft and hard policy measures. Having said that, it is evident that even within these categories nuances exist. For example the Netherlands, and the City of Amsterdam in particular, adopts a very inclusive approach - even within their hard policy segment - through the application of ‘curative measures’. These measures aim at helping people that face an identity crisis to find their place in society\textsuperscript{59}. Thus, even the intervention measures that focus on a specific individual are very much based on social cohesion and integration in society; it is more about finding the roots and re-socialising these persons, rather than 'eliminating' them from society.

Amsterdam’s approach, however, also faces criticism. A fundamental problem with regards to the 'Wij Amsterdammers' strategy is the securitisation of welfare. This involves “an intrusion or a pretension of


\textsuperscript{58} European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, ‘Inter-Cultural and Inter-Religious Policies in Amsterdam, the Netherlands’ (2009)

the security sector to reduce or to cancel the autonomy of particular professions - such as social workers, teachers, and medical professions - that are providing welfare, turning them into extensions of police work. (...) For some reason we think that in counter-radicalisation the higher objective of free speech, education, or public health should be put under the one of repression and suspicion”60. This inevitably creates an environment of fear and mistrust. Additionally, Vermeulen61 argues that the City of Amsterdam's policy has a heavy emphasis on Moroccans and Islam, whilst at the same time leaving aside right- or left-wing radicalism. Finally, Amsterdam's policy makers have expressed the view that "various voices, as long as they do not advocate violence, should be engaged, since pushing non-violent Islamists at the margins could have negative repercussions”62. A case-by-case approach has thus emerged that has involved collaboration between the authorities and non-violent Islamists when areas of agreement can be found. An excellent example in this regard is Amsterdam's collaboration with Mohammed Cheppih, a Moroccan Dutch and the Netherlands' representative of the Saudi-based Muslim World League and the Arab European League based in Belgium; an organisation being described as “provocative, polarising and opposed to integration”63.

8.2. Essex

Despite the critique outlined above, the UK Government has supported a number of local civil society initiatives that seek to nurture cohesion within society. For example, on 20th June 2012, the Department of Communities and Local Government signed a funding agreement with Searchlight Educational Trust, later to be known as Hope Not Hate. Hope Not Hate Educational Limited is a registered charity that seeks to combine research and grassroots action to counter the ‘politics of hate’; primarily through action to defeat hate groups at elections and build societal resilience against extremism64. The funds supported the organisation in its endeavours to establish local community partnerships in four areas prone to English Defence League (a far-right group) activity. Partnerships set up newsletters containing: positive stories from the area that promoted shared local identities; information about community events; and space for faith, community, and voluntary organisations to advertise and encourage participation in their own

60 Comments made during expert interview conducted with Francesco Ragazzi on October 6th 2015
64 Hope Not Hate, ‘Hope Not Hate - Our Goal’ (Hope Not Hate, 2004) <http://www.hopenothate.org.uk/who-we-are/our-goal/> accessed 21 September 2015
initiatives\textsuperscript{65}. Such initiatives are based upon a theoretical framework that conceptualises radicalisation in a broad institutional context and tackles its two common and opposing manifestations; on the one hand cultural and religious diversity is celebrated and efforts made to integrate formerly marginalised minorities into a unified society and, on the other, action is taken to discredit the provocative individuals and groups seeking to exacerbate differences and grievances between society and parallel communities existing alongside it – creating a counter-narrative.

Instead of focusing upon religious or cultural minority groups often associated with extremism, Hope Not Hate adopts a holistic approach to the issue, placing some responsibility to change upon the ‘hosts’ within society and the reluctance of ‘extremists’ within them to embrace diversity. Through endeavours to shape the values and social norms associated with the formal and informal institutions that a local society is comprised of, Hope Not Hate seeks to transform the behaviour of all individuals operating under such context-specific institutions. As individuals continue to behave under a certain set of institutions, they begin to internalise the values embodied in them, resulting in a change in the character of those individuals; in this instance, away from far-right tendencies and equally those garnered within an individual feeling marginalised by those around them, towards cohesive living. In Essex for example, Hope Not Hate has sought to counter the politics of hate spread by the British National Party, the National Front and, most recently, the UK Independence Party (UKIP). The county has a sizeable white working-class demographic that has been a target of the far-right groups’ rhetoric regarding the impact of mass immigration and socio-cultural tolerance on the British economy and society more broadly. Hope Not Hate has thus campaigned with the GMB trade union in Basildon against zero-hour contracts and low pay in an attempt to tackle the anger and abandonment those affected feel, whilst seeking to counter the provocative messaging spread by far-right organisations. The charity has helped minority groups to navigate the electoral process in order to participate in a national by-election, as well as organising intercultural events\textsuperscript{66}.

9. An Alternative Policy Framework

\textsuperscript{65}WhatDoTheyKnow, ‘Funding of Hope Not Hate’ (WhatDoTheyKnow, 2013) <https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/funding_of_hope_not_hate?unfold=1> accessed 21 September 2015

\textsuperscript{66} Hope Not Hate, ‘Hope Not Hate: Campaign Round-up 2014’ (Hope Not Hate, 2014) <http://www.hopenothate.org.uk/campaigns/2014/> accessed 21 September 2015
9.1. The EETIS Model: An Introduction

The proposed EETIS (Education, Enlightenment, Togetherness, Illuminations, Sensitivity) model (for a diagrammatic illustration see Appendix 1) seeks to nurture a unified ‘society’, moving away from previous efforts to ‘manage diversity’ between disparate ‘communities’\(^{67}\). In contrast to contemporary conceptualisations of radicalisation as associated with minority groups, the model is oriented towards the mitigation of radicalisation within society as a whole; the ‘politics of hate’ spread by those who discriminate against particular ethnic or religious peoples is therefore recognised as a symptom comparable to the behaviour of rare extremists amongst such targeted peoples. The model is therefore applicable to all settings, regardless of the ideological position. A unified society is conceptualised as being multi-layered and spatio-temporally specific. It is considered to be more than the mere totality of a broad range of unique identities and communities embodied by the people living in a certain location at a certain time; rather a distinct entity representing a qualitative transformation of these elements, whilst preserving their independent characteristics. Policies, therefore, must respect and reflect all identities embodied, whilst always addressing societies as a whole. Furthermore, policy frameworks must acknowledge the uniqueness of the particular society they are introduced to. Thus, whilst a standardised starting-point may be deemed desirable, the implementation of a 'one-fits-all approach' with no tailoring to local contexts and needs would be fundamentally misguided.

The EETIS model is designed to be implemented largely outside of bureaucratic structures so as to maximise its flexibility and iterative nature. It is intended to be accompanied by a reflexive governance structure; “societal steering that is embedded in on-going dynamics of [social] change” and embodied in practises that include participatory goal formulation and the appraisal of options based upon both their direct and indirect impacts at the system-level\(^{68}\). However, this is not to say that leadership from local governments, alongside that of the wider public sector and civil society, is not necessary. The EETIS model provides a generic framework that is to be tailored to local conditions and operationalised in a bespoke manner by an inclusive, balanced partnership representative of the whole society (e.g. diversity in administration), with a key role for local governments as facilitators of action. Most importantly, the model is to be delivered for the benefit of all of society, by all of society.

\(^{67}\) Ragazzi F, ‘Towards “Policed Multiculturalism”? Counter-Radicalization in France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom’ (2014)
The EETIS model seeks to change both society itself and the way in which society is experienced through one’s socialisation. Its benefits are therefore not easily quantifiable in the short-term, with cumulative results expected on an inter-generational scale. The model is to be considered a ‘holistic’ policy framework as its parts are in intimate interconnection, such that they cannot exist independently of the whole, or cannot be understood without reference to the whole, which is thus regarded as greater than the sum of its parts. However, its implementation is intended to be iterative, with components of it deliverable in chunks. Such components should be reviewed regularly by the local partnerships administering them, with periodic re-invention when results from such reviews call for it. There are five sub-components that make up the central, soft policy component of the EETIS model. Each sub-component has a name and a vision; societal characteristics deemed vital in order to transform societies away from the environment identified as conducive to the root causes associated with the radicalisation process. The visions outlined below are recommendations. As part of the model design process societies must formulate their own visions and renegotiate them regularly throughout their qualitative transformation. Similarly, the examples included as strategies to fulfil such visions (see Appendix 2) are intended for inspiration only and not to be seen as collectively exhaustive.

Hard policies are not excluded from the model, but are rather limited in scope and restricted to dealing with the most imminent threats for which the soft policies of the EETIS model are inapplicable due to their long-term focus. Such policies can be considered as anti-, de-, and counter-radicalisation efforts due to the ambiguous demarcation outlined previously, and should see reduced deployment over time as the EETIS model takes effect. In many countries, any ‘soft policies’ that look to enhance ‘integration’ of migrants or encourage greater ‘community cohesion’ fall under the auspice of counter-terrorism policy. The EETIS model, except for the hard policy component, is to be considered wholly separate from the ‘security’ agenda. Therefore, funding the model will involve a significant transfer of roles, responsibilities and budget from ‘counter-terrorism’/law enforcement to society programmes.

9.2. The EETIS Model: Five Sub-Components of Soft Policy

69 The authors deem it important to attribute credit to Ervin Staub, whose paper “Preventing Violence and Terrorism and Promoting Positive Relations Between Dutch and Muslim Communities in Amsterdam” (2007) was an inspiration for a number of components of the EETIS Model.
9.2.1. Education

Vision: Shared responsibility and unified action

**Recommendation 1**: Enhancement and promotion of integrated schools so as to encourage classrooms reflective of society that provide an atmosphere of openness and acceptance as well as academic achievement

**Recommendation 2**: Creation of diverse faculties that embody the significant engagement and exchange sought at the societal level

**Recommendation 3**: Expansion of the curriculum so as to build greater socio-political and cultural understanding; preparing young people for agency and leadership in society

**Recommendation 4**: Investment in education- and culture-based exchanges inside and outside the classroom so as to foster a sense of empathy, personal development, and an appetite for partnership working (across traditional divides)

**Recommendation 5**: Expansion of the exploration of world faiths and religions and encouragement of peer-taught projects so as to provide communal incentives and innovative instruction techniques

**Recommendation 6**: Education and empowerment of all people (beyond youths) to be engaged and understanding members of society

9.2.2. Enlightenment

Vision: Awareness, understanding and reconciliation

**Recommendation 7**: Exploration of ‘truth’ and the role of the media

**Recommendation 8**: Promotion of a common identity built upon diversity

**Recommendation 9**: Encouragement of an environment of exchange; exploration of experiences with the aim of psychological reconciliation

**Recommendation 10**: Facilitation of dialogue regarding points of grievance: state-society discussion about the effects of globalisation, foreign policy and domestic institutional discrimination

9.2.3. Togetherness

Vision: Functional and lasting interaction
**Recommendation 11:** Systematisation of instinctive integration; provision of the information and incentives required to maximise physical integration of traditionally ‘segregated groups’ in the context of housing, employment and education and tackle issues of economic and social disparity

**9.2.4. Illuminations**

Vision: Mutual respect and celebration of diversity

**Recommendation 12:** Facilitation of the hosting of regular society events that bring people together in order to experience one another’s traditional customs and celebrate unity in diversity, whilst creating common customs and a positive story for the society as a whole

**9.2.5. Sensitivity**

Vision: Enlightenment in action

**Recommendation 13:** Adaptation of official language and shaping of casual language to move away from the conceptualisation of multiple communities in favour of one society unified in its diversity

**Recommendation 14:** Promotion of sensitivity from all parties; efforts to reduce inflammatory effects of controversial terms and actions

**9.3. Hard Policies**

Certain ‘security’ measures are inevitably required to protect society from imminent threats posed by individuals and/or groups beyond the reach of the EETIS model (due to the extent to which they may have become radicalised or their physical distance from the society in which the model has been implemented). However, EU policy in this area was largely inspired by the United States’ ‘War on Terror’ campaign and has been proven to have had perverse effects. In light of this, the suitability of hard policies involving intensified measures of control relating to a single demographic to a disproportionate degree should be scrutinised intensively, reduced significantly in scope and communicated publicly with a justification for each procedure so as secure broad stakeholder buy-in. Only through such transparency can a ‘backlash effect’ be avoided. An example of such an effect could be observed in Birmingham (UK) in 2010, when Muslims protested against West Midlands Police’s ‘Project Champion’; 200 Automatic

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70 Bigo D, Bonelli L, Guittet EP and Ragazzi F, ‘Preventing and Countering Youth Radicalisation in the EU: Study for the LIBE Committee’ (2014)
Number-Plate Recognition cameras were installed in predominantly-Muslim areas, facilitated by national counter-terrorism funds, perceived to be for the purpose of mass surveillance of local Muslims71. Furthermore, the authorisation procedure governing such activities should involve judicial review of the information warrant-requests are based upon, as well as the implications such activities are likely to have on people’s fundamental rights. It is also recommended that governments establish independent review bodies that are provided both access to classified information and regular contact with political leaders ultimately responsible for decisions made regarding the deployment of hard policies. Such a body can ensure that the evidence-base is robust, the threats targeted are imminent, proper authorisation protocols were fulfilled, and all necessary steps were taken to mitigate the extent to which fundamental rights were infringed upon in order to achieve the required outcomes.

In line with these recommendations, concerted efforts should be made to improve the deployment of any existing control measures deemed vital so as to minimise their aggravating effects. Initiatives such as ‘Strategies for Effective Police Stop and Search’ (STEPSS) should be executed; in this instance, ethnic profile situations in Bulgaria, Hungary and Spain were documented and analysed so as to develop ways to systematically address these situations in the future72. Online activities should be better-governed so as to involve a formalised permissions structure that informs the public of the elected officials responsible and accountable for any activities undertaken. Furthermore, such activities must not infringe upon fundamental rights highlighted by resolution 2013/2188, such as the rights to data protection, freedom of expression, presumption of innocence, and effective remedy73. All measures seeking to monitor, prevent and counter the activities of ‘extremist’ individuals perceived to pose a threat to others - physical or online - must thus prioritise quality information over quantity, and be applied equally to those individuals and groups that aggravate society in such a way as to create an environment conducive for radicalisation.

10. Conclusion

In conclusion, the attainment of views considered in opposition to those held by mainstream society is not something to be infringed upon; Emmeline Pankhurst, Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela, and

73 Bigo D, Bonelli L, Guittet EP and Ragazzi F, ‘Preventing and Countering Youth Radicalisation in the EU: Study for the LIBE Committee’ (2014)
Aung San Suu Kyi are heralded today for their actions after becoming radicalised. Rather, the structural process through which an individual adopts extremist views and associated objectives and might consider utilising violent means to fulfil them is undesirable and represents a threat to society. Such a process is inherently relational and context-specific; one cannot study an individual that has become radicalised towards violent extremism in isolation. Instead, one must consider the multitude of individual, social, and environmental factors relevant to each specific case in order to understand the respective individual’s bespoke, non-linear trajectory towards violent extremism. Most importantly, one must conceptualise the individual as an institutionally-embedded, fundamentally social actor, whose behaviour is volitional, though structured and coordinated by the formal and informal institutions that that individual operates under. Laws and formal rules, but also social norms and cultures embody certain values which are, to some extent, internalised by individuals with a resulting change in their character.

Attempts to change an individual’s behaviour must thus adopt a social approach that considers structures and the power embodied within them, as opposed to simply perceiving society as a collection of distinct, empowered agents. Emphasis should be placed on bringing all peoples closer together under informal institutions they have collectively developed and communally reproduce, whilst retaining their individual socio-cultural identities. Policies that have sought to promote certain values traditional to a geographical setting in a ‘muscular’ manner have failed as a means through which to prevent radicalisation towards violent extremism; unity through homogeneity actually serves to reproduce ‘us and them’ dynamics and exacerbates socio-cultural divides and instability. Instead, a whole-of-society approach must be adopted. However, such an approach should not be understood to mean the greater application of pre-emptive judicial powers and administrative measures such as ‘stop and search’ activities across society in general (as opposed to those communities within society that have experienced disproportionate attention to date). Rather, a whole-of-society approach constitutes the design, implementation, and iterative adjustment of a model such as EETIS. The EETIS model serves as a platform upon which stakeholders throughout society can participate in the creation of an identity, common vision, and set of shared goals that enable people of a locale to celebrate unity in diversity and live in peaceful cohabitation. The prevention of radicalisation towards violent extremism is therefore a matter of society, not security.

11. Appendix 1: Diagrammatic Illustration of the EETIS Model
The EETIS Anti-Radicalisation Model

**Soft Policy**

- **Education**: Shared responsibility and unified action
- **Enlightenment**: Awareness, understanding and reconciliation
- **Togetherness**: Functional and lasting interaction
- **Illuminations**: Mutual respect and celebration of diversity
- **Sensitivity**: Enlightenment in action

**Vision**

**Hard Policy**
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<th><strong>Topic</strong></th>
<th><strong>Recommendations</strong></th>
<th><strong>Examples</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td><strong>Recommendation 1:</strong> Enhancement and promotion of integrated schools so as to encourage classrooms reflective of society that provide an atmosphere of openness and acceptance as well as academic achievement</td>
<td>e.g. Advocate for children to go to integrated schools based upon robust evidence of the benefits of diverse classroom settings (in terms of academic achievement, social skills, further life journey, career, etc.)</td>
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<td><strong>Recommendation 2:</strong> Creation of diverse faculties that embody the significant engagement and exchange sought at the societal level</td>
<td>e.g. Introduce diversity in terms of the cultural background, skills, and gender of teaching staff in schools and universities through the adaptation of policies; such policies might include new recruitment standards as well as new roles and positions, such as the compulsory recruitment of a social worker for each class</td>
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<td><strong>Recommendation 3:</strong> Expansion of the curriculum so as to build greater socio-political and cultural understanding; preparing young people for agency and leadership in society</td>
<td>e.g. Encourage young students to experience what it means to be a valuable part of society; this might include intercultural service learning projects and storytelling</td>
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<td><strong>Recommendation 4:</strong> Investment in education- and culture-based exchanges inside and outside the classroom so as to foster a sense of empathy, personal development, and an appetite for partnership working (across traditional divides)</td>
<td>e.g. Provide opportunities and encourage students to participate in student exchanges (from a young age) e.g. Promote intercultural projects outside school in order to highlight the importance of different forms of knowledge in different settings and different contexts e.g. Establish intercultural peer-groups who also collaborate outside the classroom, for example through group-projects and homework</td>
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| Recommendation 5: Expansion of the exploration of world faiths and religions and encouragement of peer-taught projects so as to provide communal incentives and innovative instruction techniques | e.g. Change the didactical methods of teachers so as to encourage actively-guided, open discussion rather than mere presentations\(^7^4\)

  e.g. Establish integrated religion courses where students learn about all religions and have the ability to openly discuss them |

| Recommendation 6: Education and empowerment of all people (beyond youths) to be engaged and understanding members of society | e.g. Provide training for public sector employees (including police officers, health professionals, and teacher) to create an environment of fairness and evidence-based decision-making\(^7^5\) |

| Enlightenment Recommendation 7: Exploration of ‘truth’ and the role of the media | e.g. Educate the public on the subjective nature of events and the extent to which information available is shaped by the perspective of the information provider, as well as the information consumer (this includes propaganda)

  e.g. Hold open and substantial discussions on the role of the media and its various responsibilities, including the issue of transparency, for example with regard to sponsorship |

| Recommendation 8: Promotion of a common identity built upon diversity | e.g. Encourage society to establish a common vision through open discussion and make this vision omnipresent and 'tangible' through promotional activities, such as a local soap opera that visualises a common identity - this can serve as a 'counter narrative' to extremist propaganda society may be exposed to |

| Recommendation 9: Encouragement of an environment of exchange; exploration of experiences with the aim of psychological reconciliation | e.g. Offer immigrants the opportunity to tell their stories at community meetings, in the media and in schools as part of an integrated and continuous process |

\(^7^4\) See for example Teaching Tolerance, “Critical Practices for Anti-bias Education” (2014)

| Recommendation 10: Facilitation of dialogue regarding points of grievance: state-society discussion about the effects of globalisation, foreign policy, domestic institutional discrimination, and the societal implications of a neoliberal economic order | e.g. Host regular public forums for discussion between diverse voices  
e.g. Distribute free and accessible information, such as summaries of discussions, as well as introductory literature to a range of social, political and economic theories that highlights relevance to everyday life |
| --- | --- |
| Togetherness | Recommendation 11: Systematisation of instinctive integration; provision of the information and incentives required to maximise physical integration of traditionally ‘segregated groups’ in the context of housing, employment and education and tackle issues of economic and social disparity | e.g. Pursue ‘quality equality’ across all schools so as to minimise disincentives for parents whilst promoting the benefits of cross-cutting relations for a child’s development  
e.g. Develop and invest in stable structures in which both children and adults can engage in substantial joint activities, such as sports teams, cultural events, and educational, community, and business projects  
e.g. Explore policies that seek to mitigate segregated housing, such as the provision of facilities for various faith groups within housing areas, affirmative action supporting greater diversity in town/city centres and the introduction of social housing obligations on all residential property developers so as to mitigate the emergence of social housing ‘ghettos’  
e.g. Encourage businesses to become equal opportunity ambassadors so as to equalise the economic standing of individuals of different cultures and ethnicities  
e.g. Widen the channels through which individuals can access social housing as well as the job market, and expand the formal and informal support mechanisms in place to facilitate access for everyone  
e.g. Prioritise ‘greenfield’ land for common goods (parks, community gardens, etc.) in order to create space for people to interact and collaborate with each other in an informal setting |
| **Illuminations** | **Recommendation 12:** Facilitation of the hosting of regular society events that bring people together in order to experience one another’s traditional customs and celebrate unity in diversity, whilst creating common customs and a positive story for the society as a whole | e.g. Host events celebrating traditional religious or cultural events of that locale, whilst encouraging the sharing of alternative, positive interpretations by both new and settled members of society.  
E.g. Host events celebrating religious or cultural milestones not previously celebrated publicly in locales with an emphasis on awareness-raising and inclusivity |
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<td><strong>Sensitivity</strong></td>
<td><strong>Recommendation 13:</strong> Adaptation of official language and shaping of casual language to move away from the conceptualisation of multiple communities in favour of one society unified in its diversity</td>
<td>e.g. Adapt the language that is used in policy documents, governmental publications, newspaper, TV, radio, schools, universities and so on, so as to highlight the concept of society rather than separating between groups or communities, whilst still acknowledging their unique identities</td>
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<td><strong>Recommendation 14:</strong> Promotion of sensitivity from all parties; efforts to reduce inflammatory effects of controversial terms and actions</td>
<td>e.g. Counter negative implications of describing certain religious practices as ‘rudimentary’ or sexual orientations as ‘perverted’ through higher sensitivity in language use</td>
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